

not give him what he needed for his life; but he was always reading, receiving American magazines and carrying to Tchirpan a message of practical Christianity and spirituality. He stood out to me as an apostle of our finest European and American thought, and yet he, too, had been a

simple peasant. His philosophy of faith, contentment, and progress was refreshing, and as I listened to his attack on materialism I felt a sense of thankfulness that, after all, here at least was one man who had come through the test of Americanization with brilliant results; he could com-

pare with some of our clearest thinkers.

Then I looked around at the Bulgarians, listening to him with understanding and sympathy, and I felt that there is a big future in the country where such a question can take up men's time.

## AN EXPANDING DOCTRINE

BY CONWAY WHITTLE COOKE

ON December 2, 1923, the time-clock of history will register the one hundredth anniversary of President Monroe's annual Message to Congress in which is included the Monroe Doctrine. For a century, then, the Doctrine, for ill or good, has stood before the four winds of heaven.

Strangely enough, we find world conditions to-day in the same condition of chaos that obtained when Monroe gave his Doctrine to the ages. Thus we may with a certain confidence review the history of the Monroe Doctrine during the past century, and analyze its effect upon the politics of both hemispheres and its general application to the present international situation.

In the first place, President Monroe has no large claim in the world, of letters. He was not given to rhetorical adventures, and we find no great collection of serious writings bearing his name. Nevertheless few men in American public life have ever more tersely or correctly put down in words the thoughts of their fellow-countrymen. It is not even probable that Monroe ever fully realized how far-reaching, how permanent, and how important his Doctrine was destined to be. But, being fundamentally sound, it has stood the test of time and is now recognized as the keystone in our policy of National defense.

As a matter of fact, the Monroe Doctrine in principle was born with our Nation. President Monroe merely put into the English language a policy which had been in force in America for nearly half a century. It is the self-same policy which caused us to sweep the Mediterranean of the Barbary pirates, to conduct the naval war with France, to clear the Spanish Main of freebooters and buccaneers, and to fight the War of 1812-15 with England. Indeed, the Doctrine is none other than that which caused us to "associate" with the Allies in the war against the Central Powers, which sent Pershing and his doughboys and Sims and his sailors to Europe.

The Doctrine is an elder brother of the Declaration of Independence. It came into our National consciousness

at Lexington and Concord. It is a fundamental National truth; more, it is a law of nature. Nature recognized that policy when she put a horn on the rhinoceros's nose and the beak and talons on the eagle. The Doctrine merely put us on record diplomatically; we were actually on record when the first gun of the Revolution was fired.

A nation is not worthy of independence if it takes no steps to defend that independence, and the Doctrine is our policy of defense. We are not alone in this doctrine of defense; every nation that has an armed force sponsors for itself a like doctrine. Stripping the Monroe Doctrine of its polite diplomatic phrases, it is a plain statement that we fought and won our independence, and did so for a purpose, that purpose being the desire "to live and let live," which we consider a proper desire to keep perpetually green; and we are not stingy with that desire, so we have turned it over to the rest of the Western Hemisphere for what it is worth.

Some historians claim that Monroe was not the author of the Doctrine which bears his name. It is credited in some quarters to John Adams, and it is true that its roots extend back to Washington's Neutrality Proclamation when France and England started one of their periodical wars in 1793; even farther back, to Washington's Farewell Address to the Army. Thomas Jefferson, too, earned some credit when he issued his warning against "entangling alliances." Again, before Monroe issued the Doctrine he submitted it to ex-Presidents Jefferson and Adams; thus it was the concrete expression of the administrative branch of the United States Government of the times. But its phraseology is Monroe's. He is unquestionably its author.

Our own War for Independence, while setting up a new political unit, did much more; it set up an opportunity for civilization which the Monroe Doctrine attempts to safeguard.

Hence we are not surprised that from the very first the United States

extended its sympathy and an enormous amount of aid to the Latin-American colonies in their wars for independence. President Adams, as a wise Chief Executive should do, proclaimed the neutrality of the United States, but this did not stop active support on the part of our citizens, and even those in high places. Henry Clay, first as a Senator, and then as Secretary of State, gave ten years of his life to intensive activities toward the independence of Latin America. The immediate cause, however, of President Monroe's declaration was the situation in Europe and America caused by the Napoleonic wars and the formation of the Holy Alliance, immediately following those wars, for the suppression of democracy and the rehabilitation and extension of autocracy.

England had developed an enormous trade with Latin America because of the treaty with Spain of 1713, which placed in the hands of the English the sole right to peddle slaves in Latin America. Yet it seemed the better part of wisdom for Britain when Napoleon invaded Spain to abandon the Latin-American colonies to themselves and assist Spain to deal Napoleon a death-blow. Nevertheless at the close of the Napoleonic wars so firmly was British influence established in Latin America that Spain thought it necessary to redouble her efforts to maintain her hold on her American colonies, otherwise they might gradually slip into the British fold.

Then came the secret Treaty of Verona signed by Austria, France, Russia, and Prussia, in which was stated the "Code of Absolutism." This Code acknowledged the divine right of kings; declared that an end must be put to systems of representative government; stated that the liberty of the press, being the most powerful means used by the pretended supporters of the rights of nations, should be suppressed; and pointed out the fact that "the principles of religion contribute most powerfully to keep nations and states in the path of obedience which they owe to their princes," in support of which the aid of the Pope was

solicited to assist in maintaining religious rule. To further their ends the Holy Alliance agreed that Spain and Portugal should be granted 20,000,000 francs a year to maintain their kingdoms and retain control of their colonies.

Surreptitious aid to and recognition of the belligerent rights of the revolting Spanish colonies brought down upon the head of the United States the condemnation of the Holy Alliance, and, as a first move to put a stop to the progress of liberalism wherever found, Russia began an encroachment on our northwest boundaries, while the Holy Alliance and the other European Powers adhering thereto took steps to restore to Spain her lost colonies in America.

At this turn of affairs the United States declared that, "with the exception of the British establishments north of the United States, the remainder of both the American continents must henceforth be left to the

management of American hands." And, upon France evolving a plan to place princes of her restored Bourbon family over the Spanish-American colonies, our Minister at the Court of St. James's, Mr. Rush, proposed to the British Foreign Office that the two countries jointly oppose such a move. This brought from George Canning the reply that "the recovery of the colonies by Spain was hopeless," that "England aimed at no possession of them herself," and that England would throw no impediment in the way of the Latin Americas and the mother country getting together by amicable negotiations, but that she "could not see any portion of them transferred to any other Power with indifference." The Rush negotiations, instead of uniting us with Great Britain in an alliance against France, brought forth the Monroe Doctrine, a notice to Great Britain as well as the rest of the world to "keep off" and let the Americas work out their own destiny.

In the essentials what President Monroe actually stated in the Doctrine, rather startling in that day and generation, follows:

The American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European Powers. . . .

With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European Power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European Power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States.

Despite the necessity, Congress emphatically refused to pass resolutions containing the Monroe Doctrine. England came to an understanding with France, recognized the young Latin-American republics, and told us that she considered her rights to colonize all unoccupied lands in the Americas still held good; while Monroe himself told the "Congress of American Nations" called together in Panama in 1826 by General Simon Bolivar, the George Washington of South America: "Each will guard by its own means against the establishment of any future European colony within its borders."

Still worse, Congress passed a resolution stating that "the United States ought not to be represented at the Congress of Panama except in a diplomatic character, nor form any alliance, defensive or offensive; nor become a part to any joint declaration for the purpose of preventing interference of any of the European Powers with their independence, or for the purpose of preventing colonization upon the continents of America."


Any sting in the Monroe Doctrine was thus pulled out before it had been in existence three years, and that spineless attitude toward the Doctrine by its author and legislative supporters has had more to do with misunderstandings between the United States and Latin America than any other one thing in our history.

Our action with respect to the Monroe Doctrine was further clouded by the issues connected with a canal across Central America. Misunderstandings with England in Caribbean waters and in Central American affairs nearly resulted in war, which, however, was shunted to one side by the shameless Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of April 19, 1850, whereby England was left in possession of all she

### The passage in President Monroe's Message to Congress in 1823 which announced the Monroe Doctrine

**I**N the discussions to which this interest has given rise and in the arrangements by which they may terminate, the occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European Powers.

In the wars of the European Powers in matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy so to do. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparation for our defense. With the movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity more immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers. The political system of the allied Powers is essentially different in this respect from that of America. This difference proceeds from that which exists in their respective governments; and to the defense of our own. . . . We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those Powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European Power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European Power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States.



*James Monroe*

WHOSE ADDRESS TO CONGRESS CRYSTALLIZED A FUNDAMENTAL AMERICAN CONCEPT

claimed in Latin America, while the United States was excluded from Central America forever, with the proviso that should a canal under any terms be built by us we must guarantee its neutrality with Great Britain, even to the extent of holding it open to our enemies.

Opportunity after opportunity was thus lost to us to build a canal because of the terms of this treaty, while British aggression was permitted to go on apace, inasmuch as Great Britain refused to consider the Monroe Doctrine as being based upon international law. We kept shouting the Doctrine to the world, but would not fight for it.

Small wonder that our weak-kneed support of the Doctrine bred mistrust, suspicion, and downright worry on the part of Latin America concerning our application of the principles involved when Latin-American affairs were the issue. Nevertheless our various Administrations have reiterated Monroe's pronouncements and called into international diplomacy the policy underlying the Doctrine. And to good

purpose, for the Doctrine, sometimes backed by a show of force, finally drove the French out of Mexico, stopped British and German land-grabbing in Venezuela, and forced Great Britain to abrogate the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty in favor of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of 1901. This last treaty enabled the United States to build the Panama Canal. Yet it was not until the Versailles Treaty that general recognition of the Monroe Doctrine was officially forthcoming. All the nations signatory to that Treaty now recognize it as a potent factor in international affairs.

In Latin America alone there still exists animosity toward the Monroe Doctrine. Before the Panama episode Latin America had generally looked upon the Doctrine as a measure of protection. Since that time, however, it has seemed to some of our southern neighbors that it is nothing more than an imperialistic "big stick" held over their shoulders. On the contrary, the Doctrine was promulgated to the world and has since been maintained for no other purpose than to protect

this continent from the aggressions of European imperialism, and during its existence it has been the main bulwark and at times the only guaranty of the liberty of those countries comprising Latin America. It is an undeniable truth that Latin-American countries have derived their constitutions, their methods of government, and much of their prosperity from us. Far from detracting from the sovereignty of Latin-American republics, the Monroe Doctrine has enriched, stabilized, and guaranteed that sovereignty.

Hence we have no other desire than to see the republics in Central and South America develop along the lines of political order and individual liberty, that the Western Hemisphere may be the home and exponent of democratic ideals of political thought as opposed to the autocratic imperialistic ambitions which have rocked European civilization to the foundations and left Europe a political madhouse. Not domination, not coercion, not meddling interference, but the heartiest co-operation in the development of civilization's choicest ideals is the intercourse which we desire with Latin America.

It appears, then, considering present conditions in Europe, that the Monroe Doctrine takes on more importance as time goes on; that because of the rise of fanatic Socialism, Bolshevism, dictatorships, and disruptive social upheavals in Europe we must hold fast to the Doctrine as a factor in the welfare of the Americas. Not only must we oppose aggression from without, but we must strangle and trample out of existence attacks from within in order that freedom and the general welfare shall be protected.

This leads to the thought that for the next hundred years, and as long as time shall endure, the Doctrine must be maintained, and, in addition, we must apply its principles to the social, economic, and political solidarity of the American republics. This means a more complete realization of the movement, sponsored by the Doctrine, called Pan-Americanism. The nations of this hemisphere have so much in common that they, perforce, must undertake more complete co-operation in a joint development of the resources of North and South America for the benefit of Americans. While we have been watchful with respect to European territorial encroachments, we have permitted "peaceful penetration" by European nations in Latin America through investment and colonization. The time has arrived for the United States to enter Latin America on a co-operative investment basis, making the Americas a self-supporting, self-contained community of nations. This is the essence of the Monroe Doctrine of the future.

# THE NEW SAHARA

BY OSCAR LEWIS

ONE listens with surprise to the statement—often made in North Africa—that the mystery and romance of the Sahara are passing. Even in a world full of change we had yet come to regard the great African desert as somehow unchanging and unchangeable, as defying by its very vastness the puny powers of man. Yet no one can visit even the outer fringes of the desert to-day without realizing that the Sahara no longer answers the descriptions in the old school geographies, and without foreseeing that still greater changes are presently to occur.

Even before personal acquaintance with the desert begins, while one has yet to see its nearest frontiers, it becomes necessary to revise some preconceived notions. The picture, long treasured in the mind, of the first glimpse of the Sahara, to be had, you decide beforehand, at sunset and at the end of the second day of travel from some outpost of civilization—this is the first dream to be brushed aside. For it is not necessary to travel even one day from civilization in order to view the Sahara. It is not necessary to leave civilization at all. So far as material comfort goes, as what we know by the name of modern conveniences, civilization has been brought to the desert.

The traveler to the Sahara gets on an excellent train at Algiers. He sleeps in a sleeping-car as he thunders across the plateaus and through the mountain ranges of North Africa, and he breakfasts the next morning in a diner. And by luncheon that same day he is there; he is rolling due south through the desert and neglecting his *hors-d'œuvre* at sight of his first caravan of camels.

A few hours later he reaches the oasis which is the terminus of the railway. Buses and cabs wait at the station to convey him to comfortable, and even luxurious, hotels; an orchestra will play for him at dinner that night. Later, if he cares to, he may walk a hundred yards through an unchanged and barbaric native quarter and find himself facing the ghostly, sleeping, illimitable desert. Or he may walk fifty yards in another direction and go to a movie.

Not all oases of the Sahara, assuredly, are like this. Not all of them can be reached by express trains with sleeping-cars and diners, and there are still hotels in the Sahara where one must do without an orchestra at dinner, or oases without the hotels themselves—even, perhaps, without the dinner.

This particular oasis, though not typical of the Sahara, is interesting. It is a show-place. One of the chief aims of its existence during the four cool months is to so conduct itself that the hundreds of tourists who pour down from the north shall be supplied with their accustomed hotels and orchestras and yet have preserved the illusion that here they are rubbing shoulders with a new civilization; that Arab life, raw and untouched, is going on about them. It is a difficult rôle, and Biskra plays it well.

But Biskra, again, is not the desert. It is neither the desert of the past nor a fair example of what the desert is going to be in the future. It is a unique phenomenon, and a passing one. Already the signs of its passing are appearing. Biskra is no longer the last outpost of modern improvements in the Sahara. A new railway, also with sleeping-cars and dining-cars, has been constructed. Biskra is likewise the terminus of this line, but its "civilized," not its frontier, terminus. Its other end—at present—lies two hundred and twelve kilometers due south toward the heart of the Sahara, at another oasis, Touggourt. Already the tourists, four days from London, who "want to live the life of the desert" pause at Biskra only long enough to shift themselves and their trunks and hat-boxes from one train to another.

Thus, while Touggourt by a natural and inevitable sequence becomes a second Biskra, Biskra itself in the course of time may develop into something more important, and even, perhaps, more interesting. It may become the first metropolis of the New Sahara; a town neither Arabic nor European, but a skillful combination of the two, adapting the comfort, utility, hygiene, of a modern European town to the special conditions, climatic and commercial, of the desert.

Already, under its surface similarity to a circus side-show, Biskra has made a substantial step in this direction. Sweep away its hordes of guides and souvenir venders, its commercial dance-halls and Ouled Nail girls, its groups of tourists endlessly riding camels at ten francs an hour around and around the same streets of the Old Town, its "camp a night in the desert" agencies—sweep these away, and it will be seen that Biskra, with its straight, paved streets, its cool plazas, its rows of modern buildings, solidly built, with an eye alike to their commercial utility and the climate of the desert, has already made no inconsiderable progress. And the progress has been in the direction

which all towns of the New Sahara must ultimately travel.

A glance at a map will show that nearly all the vast area of the Sahara is tinted in the color of France. The problem of the future of the Sahara, hence, is France's problem. There are not many unprejudiced observers who will deny that it is in good hands, but the problem of course has scarcely been touched. In the immensity of the Sahara there are huge blocks of territory that have never even been seen by a member of the conquering nation. There are tribes, self-contained and self-governing, which live in profound ignorance of the fact that they are a subject people ruled by a French Governor-General of whom they have never heard. It is true that over vastly the greater part of the Sahara the influence of the French occupation as yet has hardly made itself felt. But the measure of French success is to be found, not in the tremendous things that must yet be done, but by an examination of what in the short time the occupation has been in effect has already been accomplished.

If the present-day traveler, riding into the desert on his excellently appointed train, cares to amuse himself by a picture of the romance of progress, he has only to sit up in his comfortable berth and reflect upon the fact that ninety years ago Algiers, that stupendous metropolis of North Africa, as French to-day as the Place de l'Opéra, was a pirate stronghold. It was the base of operations for a fleet of outlaw craft that swarmed over the Mediterranean and exacted tribute from every maritime nation as a price of immunity. This is the modern story of North Africa: Ninety years ago its seaport metropolis, its most enlightened city, a nest of pirates; to-day, railway trains, highroads, modern cities, extend far back to the interior plateaus, and beyond these into the desert itself. Even in western America, where decades often count for centuries, we have no story of progress to exceed this.

The change was not accomplished without mistakes and without costs. Unlike America, it was no diffuse population of simple aboriginal tribes that had to be contended with. The Arabs were not displaced, they were subjugated; and, while the experience of being a subject race was not a new one, they assumed the rôle only after a long and bitter struggle, a struggle that did not always reflect with entire credit either upon the military skill of the French or upon their diplomacy. It can be said that during the first third of the ninety years the French